Mann's Take: "Democratic Turnout Stunk"

I cannot tell you how wrong I think Mann's analysis is. But it's basically a distillation of the conventional wisdom here in Harris County. This is effectively the "Democratic turnout stunk in 2008" theory, stated as succinctly as I think can be done ...

Democrats had big plans for the Houston area this election. They dreamed of sweeping Harris County much as they had done in Dallas two years ago. They organized and fund-raised like never before--instituting a countywide coordinated campaign funded by millions of dollars (see "Turning Houston Blue," TO, October 17, 2008). They talked of a takeover in Texas' largest county that would be a foundation for Democrats to win future statewide races for governor and the U.S. Senate.

It didn't happen.

Voters didn't turn out in Harris County in the numbers that Democrats had hoped for. As a result, while Democrats captured a handful of key races in the Houston metro area, they came nowhere close to their much-talked-about sweep.

Democrats performed well in spots. Barack Obama narrowly carried Harris County--the first Democratic presidential candidate to do so in 44 years. The party captured a handful of closely watched state House races, including Kristi Thibaut's unseating of incumbent Republican Jim Murphy in western Harris County. Adrian Garcia became Harris County Sheriff, ousting the embattled GOP incumbent whose department has been the subject of a federal investigation following 140 inmate deaths at the county jail since 2001. Democrats also gained a major foothold at the county courthouse, winning 23 out of 40 judicial races. Every judge in the county had been Republican.

But the GOP leadership of Harris County remained mostly intact. County Judge Ed Emmett cruised to re-election. So did Tax Assessor Paul Bettencourt, whom Democrats were especially eager to beat because the office handles voter registration. They accuse Bettencourt of overzealously scrubbing the voter rolls to hold down Democratic turnout. (Bettencourt says he follows the law.)

The GOP also kept the Harris County district attorney's office. Republican Pat Lykos eked out a win by just half a percentage point over Brad Bradford. It was a particularly bitter loss for Democrats, not only because of the narrow margin but also because Bradford was bidding to become the state's second-ever African-American district attorney in a county with a history of racial bias in its criminal justice system.

Lower-than-expected turnout--especially on Election Day--scuttled Democratic hopes for a sweep. The Harris County Democratic Party hoped that 1.3 million voters would cast ballots. And during the early voting period, when more than 726,000 people voted, Democrats seemed well on their way to hitting their turnout targets. Most Democratic candidates led their races in the early voter totals.

But the plan fell apart on Election Day. Not even 450,000 voters turned out on November 4, roughly 200,000 fewer than expected. The GOP dominated among those voters. It was the scenario feared by some Democratic activists, who had worried that the Harris County coordinated campaign wasn't devoting enough resources to get-out-the-vote efforts. They had few paid organizers focused on ushering voters to the polls.

Harris County is majority Democratic--at least on paper--if only they all voted, says Fred Lewis, who worked on Democratic campaign efforts in Houston. Democrats don't need to persuade people with advertising. They have enough potential voters. The problem has been low turnout. And it still is.

The push and pent-up enthusiasm among Dems to vote early (myself among them) should have always been seen as approaching a zero-sum game. I say "approaching" because turnout actually went up in the areas we would have wanted them to go up:

African-American precincts:
2004 TO ... 45.9%
2008 TO ... 54.2%

Hispanic precincts:
2004 TO ... 46.3%
2008 TO ... 50.7%

Apartment precincts:
2004 TO ... 51.0%
2008 TO ... 58.3%

By comparison, the Anglo GOP precincts I've measured only went up by 2 points (71.5 to 73.7). The scoreboard from all of this indicates that our gains were in three areas:

1. We got improved turnout in Dem-friendly areas. Period. Suggestions to the contrary are not based on data. They're based on bored poll workers who couldn't figure out why everyone voted early.

2. Minds changed in every area. This was more critical in the non-Dem friendly areas since the Dem-friendly areas have been at something close to an effective ceiling of support since 2004. Still, there were gains everywhere.

3. New Stuff ... these areas moved with practically negligible attention from many party officials, both in terms of turnout and Dem performance. I'll proof my numbers on Monday, but I suspect the changes seen here will still be dramatic and telling.

The challenge going forward is how Democratic campaign operations recognize the expanded base we now have and properly reading Early Vote trends - something made appreciably difficult by the jacked-up Dem Primary in 2008.