A Third Way For Iraq?

David Ignatius - The Big Question Democrats Are Ducking - David Ignatius

I wish Democrats (and Republicans, for that matter) were asking this question: How do we prevent Iraq from becoming a failed state? Many critics of the war would argue that the worst has already happened -- Iraq has unraveled. Unfortunately, as bad as things are, they could get considerably worse. Following a rapid American pullout, Iraq could descend into a full-blown civil war, with Sunni-Shiite violence spreading throughout the region. In this chaos, oil supplies could be threatened, sending prices well above $100 a barrel. Turkey, Iran and Jordan would intervene to protect their interests. James Fallows titled his collection of prescient essays warning about the Iraq war "Blind Into Baghdad." We shouldn't compound the error by being "blind out of Baghdad," too.

The Democrat who has tried hardest to think through these problems is Sen. Joseph Biden. He argues that the current government of national unity isn't succeeding in holding Iraq together and that America should instead embrace a policy of "federalism plus" that will devolve power to the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish regions. Iraqis are already voting for sectarian solutions, Biden argues, and America won't stabilize Iraq unless it aligns its policy with this reality. I disagree with some of the senator's conclusions, but he's asking the right question: How do we fix Iraq?

America needs to reckon with the message of the National Intelligence Estimate. Iraq has compounded Muslim rage and created a dangerous crisis for the United States. The Democrats understandably want to treat Iraq as George Bush's war and wash their hands of it. But the damage of Iraq can be mitigated only if it again becomes the nation's war -- with the whole country invested in finding a way out of the morass that doesn't leave us permanently in greater peril. If the Democrats could lead that kind of debate about security, they would become the nation's governing party. But what you hear from most Democrats these days is: Gotcha.

Like my fascination for Sebastian Mallaby's writing, I'll lend my own point to borrow here in that Ignatius, too, writes his best work when straying from conventional wisdom. He fails to do that here in regard to the political climate of the Iraq debate, but I think he nails it with regard to Iraq policy itself. It's an odd mixture to read through, but I believe he ultimate arrives at good points after wading through murky datapoints that spur his reasoning.

To say that "Some extreme war critics are so angry at Bush they seem almost eager for America to lose, to prove a political point." is as pointless an addition to a serious discussion as there is when a natural rejoinder might go as follows: "Even the liberal Nancy Pelosi doesn't make that argument." That said, I'm sure there are some - even among the elected class - who do fit that description. But nobody takes them seriously.

Ignatius notes Joe Biden as an earnest fixer of the status quo. I might point out that the thinking class has a healthy roster of such types: Ken Pollack, James Galbraith, Will Marshall, Reza Aslan, Larry Diamond, Michael McFaul and a multitude of others. But hey, there's newspapers to sell. I get that.

Ignatius doesn't make an effort to be prescriptive here - though he implies some curiousity regarding Biden's (Galbraith's, really) notions of sectarian federalism. Like Ignatius, I'm wary of the concept, but it may be the last, least-worst hope for a good outcome ... or simply a not-horrendous outcome.

Another entrant not mentioned by Ignatius, however ... Joe Lieberman. True, he's been rejected by a whopping 52% of Connecticut Democrats. But Joe offered up a surprisingly great speech laying out some particulars on how to move forward:

The Clear Choice on Iraq: Giving Up or Getting the Job Done - Sen. Joe Lieberman

The first half of the speech is an unfortunately needed reminder of the political reality - Ned Lamont's plan(s) is(are) a disaster. I'll leave that for Joe's text to enumerate, but I think even the staunchest of war critics out there would be well served to ask what they really see the outcome of his plan (or theirs) to truly be.

Turning toward the prescriptive portion of the text, I want to go through item by item here ...

• Fire Donald Rumsfeld. Obviously, a point that Joe and I disagree on here (as difficult as Rummy has made this over the long hard slog of his tenure).

• Convene an international crisis conference with Britain, European and Arab leaders.
  A worthy idea, but one that unfortunately gets lost in the translation of "Great ideas that Dems and a few sane Republicans have been talking about, but George W. Bush simply does not believe in and is therefore incapable of carrying out successfully ... like Iraqi Reconstruction itself!" Still, it warrants inclusion in any serious-minded list. But I can't help but wonder if those are crickets chirping in the background, or merely Joe's "convenient" Republican political friends who cannot fathom two things in this world: internationalism and the fact that, had George Bush executed this war in a manner initially laid out as Lieberman had offered, we wouldn't be in this mess.

• Get "tougher" with Iraqi political leadership.
  Nice idea here, and one that's becoming increasingly necessary for the likes of Lieberman, Biden (and McCain) to start opening their eyes (and mouths) to. The current Iraqi leadership has been cherry-picked not on the basis of effective leadership skills, but rather their willingness to say nice things about the Bush administration. That creates a huge problem when it comes time to exert an ounce of leadership on your own folks to persevere with security training when you can simply kiss the brass ring, go on Fox News, and tell everyone how desparately US forces are needed in your country with no light at the end of the tunnel. It's time to treat Iraqi leadership like grownups instead of welfare state clients. Kudos to Joe for this point.

• Push Iraqis to accept a National Compact that guarantees shared power and resources among Shia, Sunni, and Kurds.
  Details needed. It's been a while since I've followed the negotiations of Iraqi constitutionalism, so I'm loosely sceptical that this just opens up a can of worms ... possibly leading to a fatal dissolution, but I consider that outcome a distant outlier.

• Put our best American commanders in the field and keep them there.
  Ya know, I picked up Harlan Ulman's recent book, America's Promise Restored, a few weeks ago for a test-read. I really wasn't sure what to make of it since it went a bit off-topic from Ullman's traditional strength of military strategy and tactics. This time around, he's added political commentary and arrives at some interesting suggestions - some a tad naive, but most very thought-provoking. One observation (that deserves better researching than I'll offer for now) made in the midst of this was that in World War II, we saw military leaders see a mission through to the end, and move into avenues of academia or think tanks that allowed them to influence and affect policy based on their experties. Think about this ... what parallel avenues are there today that offer that outcome? Commandars and Ambassadors in Iraq have signed up for 12 month terms (or less) only to rotate out, sign a book deal, and go into the private sector with little-to-no evident sense of mission completion in the long run. Some of the underlying economic differences between then and now are for the better. But there's something awfully troubling with Ullman's point, and may very well be incredibly damning about the sense of commitment that even George W. Bush himself has to seeing this through to a successful conclusion.

  Ultimately, Joe's point is a simplistic-sounding remedy that one might pass off as another passing of the political parade floats of September. But the underlying truth behind the need for that suggestion is more deserving of thought by those on the right as well as the left.

• Increase by two or three times the number of US soldiers embedded in Iraqi units.
  Careful here ... he's not calling for tripling the number of troops, total. We're talking advisor troops that essentially serve as trainers, consultants, and advisors to Iraqi teams. I'd like a bit more detail on this point and the lack of hard numbers for the time being means a reservation in judgement. If it's borne out that Bush/Rumsfeld haven't been bumping up this total for all the time they've given lip service to "standing down when Iraqis stand up," there's got to be some doubt sowed even among Bush apologists by that.

  I'd love to see Joe go even beyond this point and adapt Thomas Barnett's idea of creating an entirely new arm of the military devoted to nation-building. But I've never gotten a warm, fuzzy feeling that Joe is as down with the concept of nation-building as myself or Barnett.

• Put a priority on building logistics capabilities in Iraqi units and increase the strength of the Iraqi security forces
  See above. That this point even has to be made this late in the game is a virtual indictment of Bush's execution of the war and reconstruction.

• Focus resources on the creation of jobs and the provision of basic services in the Baghdad area.
  Again ... crickets, or those "convenient" Republicans for Joe?

• Increase the size of the US Army and Marine Corp.
  One word: Amen!

  More words ... this point gets muddled in the Rumsfeld-style of military reform. According to the Rummy manifesto, we should be shedding enlistees over time, not adding. That might be fine if this were 1993. But the scope of global jihadism, to me at least, means we need both the volume of more troops total as well as the more nimble, flexible, smaller-footprint approach advocated by Rumsfeld, et al. Or do we have to wonder why it is that Iran's theocrats and North Korea's autocrats can yank our diplomatic chain while we're tapped out on troops, too impotent as a nation to stamp out a mere Darfur genocide with 5,000 troops?

• Form a bipartisan Iraq working group in the next Congress to overcome divisions at home
  Color me skeptical. I mean, nothing against the approach as offered, but what's to say it won't be just as divided as the Intel Committee is? I think Joe's heart is in the right place with this, but the means for accomplishing it won't come from a Congressional hearing room.

I'd love to see more discussion evolve from Joe's points. That might be a tough task to hope for in the current political climate. But September turns into January so fast these days. And if Democrats want to be seen as responsible stewards of American safety, a simplistic notion that withdrawing to our own shores might make us safer isn't a long-lasting idea for a sustainable electoral majority.

Perhaps not as big of a picture here, but I think it warrants some applause that we're seeing the real Joe Lieberman again ... the one that embraces his inner wonkishness and goes into a fair amount of detail. It's truly his strength and a sizable reason for my own admitation of his policy approaches. A part of me wants to reduce this down to Dan Gerstein doing a great communications job with a client he knows well. And I suspect Dan does deserve a proper shout-out for this. But the real masterstroke is that this is the Joe we watchers of national politics saw in Joe back in 1988 and all throughout his tenure leading the DLC during much of the Clinton era. In essence, it's Joe that deserves the louder applause for getting back to doing what he does best. If Dan or any others deserve a share of that limelight, I suspect it's simply for getting Joe to be Joe again.