GregsOpinion.com

Low-balling the Sys Admin force in Iraq is backfiring

Another voice in the responsible center with a status reading of Iraq. In this case, Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map:

A while back Central Command split the command structure in Iraq, basically going with one command that would focus on building up the provisional government's institutional capacity to restore order (the Sys Admin work) and a second that would focus on quelling the insurgency (the Leviathan job). The Sys Admin job is called the Multinational Security Transition Command (clear enough language, as far as I'm concerned), and the standing up of this body has been slow going from the start.

Three months into the effort, described by all as the highest priority task in Iraq right now (we've backed off from squelching the insurgency strongholds to gather our strength in this manner prior to a big December push preceding the hoped-for January elections), and less than half of the command's staff are in place. Who are they missing most? Lawyers and procurement experts. Here's what observers are saying:

Senior military officials in Washington and in the Persian Gulf region say the delay in filling the headquarters jobs stems from the Pentagon's methodical?some say plodding?approach to establishing a new organization with the complex mission of preparing more than 250,000 members of the Iraqi police, border patrol, national guard and army for duty.

In short, the Pentagon is dragging its feet in yet another example of its general unease with the world of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), or what I call the "everything else" long orphaned by a U.S. military that prefers to plot the big one against some near-peer competitor.

So what has Lt. Gen. David Petraeus resorted to in his quest to stand up his command? He has begged, borrowed and stolen from military commands all over the world, tapping even West Point and the British in Iraq. Plus he's relied extensively on contractors.

Petraeus has the toughest row to how, because his own Army evinces the greatest amount of resistance to the concepts embodied by the Sys Admin force. Yes, I know I get a lot of emails from younger officers who cite all the change from below, but it's the resistance at the top that worries me?not Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker but all those generals around in the Pentagon, plus all the "gray beards," or retired flags who now operate in all those Beltway Bandit think tanks that perform studies and analyses.

This resistance is only natural, because the Army's evolution toward the Sys Admin force will be the most painful of the four services (although the Navy, if it ever catches on, will realize it places a close second). So when people ask me, "How long will it take for the Pentagon to move toward the Sys Admin force?" I reply simply, "The speed of advance will be a function of the pain and failures we encounter in ongoing operations like Iraq."

It's both that simple and that sad.

On a better note, Europe and the U.S. seem set to forgive Iraq's debts by the end of the year. Why should that take more than a year and a half for the "West" to agree to? Pretty much an asinine argument over the exact percentage to be cut. The U.S. wants 90%, Europe 80%, and Russia more like 65%. This sort of chintzy debate over percentage points shows how little intra-Core unity exists over the question of what it will take to integrate Iraq into the global economy after many years of sanctions. Holding up this decision has only scared off foreign direct investment immeasurably over the course of the occupation.

This is yet another huge example of why the A-to-Z rule set inside the Core on how to process politically-bankrupt states within the Gap is so crucial. Negotiating this on a case-by-case basis in hugely inefficient, leading to these sorts of idiotic fights over pennies on the dollar. Meanwhile Iraq burns and American personnel are losing their lives as the Core's "great powers" diddle over how the financial "pain" is spread.

Then again, if you're not going to fund the Sys Admin force sufficiently, I guess there's not much of a hurry to forgive the country's debts, because FDI can't flow until both the market and military sides of this tightly-wound nexus are accounted for.

Not exactly a read that gets under the skin of the casual reader (who, after all, allows their blood to boil that enough procurement experts aren't in Iraq right now?). Still, another entry into the long litany of indicators that planning and execution have taken a backseat to blind optimism for the sake of political salesmanship. Barnett focuses more on how this failure is indicative of a greater failure: that of devising a ruleset that aids in dealing with those "Gap" nations he describes as the central hotspots we will be dealing with in the foreseeable future.

On another note, I'm long overdue for a review of Barnett's book. I cannot pretend that I'd do it justice, but it is one that I'd recommend to anyone interested in foreign affairs, whether they typically agree with me or not. Its a breezy read as far as books of the nature go. Obvious pitfall is that it doesn't get too deep on details. But its not exactly a lightweight read either. The tone is more in the theoretical realm, attempting to make the beginnings of an attachment to the real world it tries to describe. Barnett takes the task of suggesting we essentially need a new set of rules to describe and deal with the types of problems we face in a post Cold War era. The nature of our enemies and of our problem situations are vastly different. That doesn't just place new demands on the military, but also in the rule-making bodies that deal with them: allies, for lack of a better term. Hence, his frustration at the piddly debate over debt relief.

On the "Saved, but not yet Read" list is this Michael O'Hanlon peice on the need to increase the size of the deployable Army (via Phil Carter).